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Abstract 
Elvang-Gsransson, M. and 0. Owe, A simple sequent calculus for partial functions, Theoretical 
Computer Science 114 (1993) 317-330. 
Usually, the extension of classical logic to a three-valued logic results in a complicated calculus, with 
side-conditions on the rules of logic in order to ensure consistency. One reason for the necessity of 
side-conditions is the presence of nonmonotonic operators. Another reason is the choice of 
consequence relation. Side-conditions severely violate the symmetry of the logic. By limiting the 
extension to monotonic cases and by choosing an appropriate consequence relation, a simple 
calculus for three-valued logic arises. The logic has strong correspondences to ordinary classical 
logic and, in particular, the symmetry of the Genzen sequent calculus (LK) is preserved, leading to 
a simple proof for cut elimination. 
1. Introduction 
Over the past years, numerous logics for handling partial functions and a “gap” in 
the truth values have been defined. Most of these so-called three-valued logics are 
obtained by extending the interpretation of the usual classical connectives, for in- 
stance, as suggested by Kleene, and by adding new connectives to reflect the increased 
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expressive power needed to capture well-definedness properties, and then define 
a calculus which is complete with respect to such interpretations. In computer science 
applications, gaps may exist not only for truth values but also for all types involved, 
corresponding to “undefined” values. Thus, the term “three-valued” is not quite 
appropriate. We are interested primarily in formalisms where “gaps” correspond to 
meaningless values (or rather nonexisting values), for instance, caused by run-time 
errors or nontermination. 
In this paper we question whether all these efforts have resulted in the “right” 
three-valued logic. Our response will be a three-valued calculus which has never 
seriously been considered before. The logic arises as a natural extension of the 
two-valued classical case to the three-valued monotonic case. As we shall see, its 
validity concept-together with an inductive definition of definedness - gives rise to 
a very simple proof system. 
Section 2 justifies our interest in the calculus, which then is formally introduced 
through Sections 3 and 4. A few interesting properties of the calculus are described in 
Section 5 and some final remarks are placed in Section 6. 
We assume that the reader is familiar with standard definitions from logic and 
denotational semantics. The applicability for three-valued logics is well motivated by 
others (refer e.g. [S]). We refer readers looking for a survey of three-valued logics to 
[l, 3, 5, 9, 14, 161. 
2. Motivation and background 
In order to formalize the use of assumptions (hypotheses) in a convenient way, we 
consider sequents of the form A E B, expressing that if the hypothesis A is true, then we 
can entail that the consequent B is true as well. For now, we assume that A and B are 
single formulas (taking true as the default hypothesis). Thus, one entails true con- 
sequents from true hypotheses; however, in the classical setting we could as well have 
read that from nonfalse hypotheses we entail true consequents. This distinction is 
without importance in classical logic, but in logics with a third value this distinction 
is important, and we see it as the philosophical motivation for the logic discussed in 
this paper. 
In a three-valued setting, there are four obvious ways of reading A k B. Apart from 
the two possibilities mentioned above, one may say that nonfalse consequents are 
entailed from nonfalse hypotheses or that nonfalse consequents are entailed from true 
hypotheses. We shall use the terminology that hypotheses and consequents are 
interpreted weakly (strongly) if they are taken to be nonfalse (true). Thus, we have the 
four possible interpretations of A F B, leading to four different consequence relations. 
These are subsequently referred to as “ss”, “ws”, “ww”, and “SW”, respectively. 
It follows that ws is the most restrictive (in the sense that all sequents valid in ws are 
valid with the other consequence relations) and SW the least restrictive. Furthermore, 
ss and ww are dual in the sense that the validity of the sequent A I- B in one is 
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equivalent to 1 B k 1 A in the other. For instance, sequents like I- l/O # l/O are valid 
in SW and ww, and sequents like l/O= l/O l- l/O# l/O are valid in SW, ww and ss 
(assuming division by zero is undefined and that = is strict); however, none of them 
are valid in ws. And l-A * A is not valid in ws and ss with Kleene’s implication 
operator. With his interpretation, A * B is true when A is false or B is true, is false 
when A is false and B is true, and is undefined otherwise. Other implication operators 
may be defined, but are not natural for computer science reasoning, and will not be 
considered. 
As examples of logics of the different kinds we have: ss [2,4], called LPE; SW 
[ll, 12,9], called PFOL in the latter; ww [13,15], called WL; and ws [7, 16-J. The four 
consequence relations defined above are the ones most commonly identified by 
authors [9,14]. Other consequence relations can be defined, and more possibilities are 
discussed in [l, 161. In Cl], one searches for a mathematically natural partial logic, 
restricting oneself to reflexive and transitive consequence relations, whereas the 
implication operator need not be as suggested by Kleene. In contrast, we restrict the 
implication operator, as explained, but not the consequence relation. In fact, the 
consequence relation of SW is not transitive, and that of ws is not reflexive. 
For consequence relations that give the same interpretation of hypotheses and 
consequents, it is possible to define natural deduction [17] predicate calculi (in the 
style of e.g. [2, 151, where hypotheses occur only in premises), but for consequence 
relations that do not have this property, it may be necessary to use proof rules with 
premises as well as conclusions expressed by means of sequents. For instance, consider 
the following two versions of “modus ponens”: 
k-A=-B t-A 
and 
t-A*B 
At-B 
Only the latter rule is sound in SW. Both are sound in ws and is ss, whereas neither is 
sound in ww. In particular, in SW one may not conclude t- B from l- A and A F-B. 
The consequence relation of ws preserves the classical duality between the logical 
implication and the consequence relation, the duality principle, i.e. the validity of 
A k B is equivalent to that of k A a B. In contrast, ww and ss do not satisfy this 
equivalence. It turns out that all classical rules of many sorted logic are sound in ws 
without any modification! Thus, ws provides reasoning closer to classical logic than 
the other consequence relations. 
Also from an intuitive point of view, ws appears attractive: In ws nothing can be 
proved from or about undefinedness since an undefined hypothesis gives no informa- 
tion and may be ignored, whereas an undefined consequent is impossible to prove and 
may be replaced by false. An undefined formula occurring in (the hypothesis or in the 
consequent of) a sequent may be replaced by anything without losing validity. 
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We will investigate below the advantages of ws further, and we will discuss a formal 
system for ws logic (WSL). 
Correspondence to the LK-calc~dus 
Consider sequents where the hypothesis consists of a list of formulas (interpreting 
commas as A’S. with true as default), and where the consequent consists of a list of 
formulas (interpreting commas as v’s, with false as default). The duality principle 
may not be formalized as: f 1, A t B, r, is equivalent to rI t- A * B, TZ, which again is 
equivalent to r, I- -I A, B, r2 (letting indexed T’s denote arbitrary lists of formulas, 
possibly empty). 
As stated, WSL has the property that strongly true consequents are entailed from 
the hypothesis. Thus, I--A,lA is not valid, reflecting the gap in truth values, but 
I- 1 d [A], A,1 A is valid, where d [A] is the condition for the definedness of A. By 
the duality principle, this may be rephrased as: A I-A is not valid, but d [A], A FA is 
valid. The latter (in one of its formulations) is the logical axiom (schema) of WSL, 
which replaces the trivial sequent A t.4 of classical logic. 
As a consequence of the duality principle, we have that the sequent I-r, A E f, is 
equivalent to I-r F 1 A, r,, and rI I-A, r, is equivalent to I-r, 1 A F I-,. Thus, for- 
mulas in a sequent may be moved around as in classical logic. As a direct consequence, 
a sequent may be rewritten as one without hypotheses. A sound and complete set of 
proof rules for such sequents is quite simple, and a sound and complete set of proof 
rules for sequents with hypotheses is easily derived. It turns out that the classical rules 
of LK-calculus [IO] are sound in ws without any modification. The requirement that 
substitutions must be well-defined may be expressed through the typing premises 
needed in the many-sorted version of LK-calculus. Together with the WSL axiom and 
rules for well-definedness, they form a sound and complete system. WSL without 
logical axioms and without the well-definedness operator is equivalent to many- 
sorted LK-calculus without logical axioms. The LK-calculus without logical axioms 
is also considered by Stark [ 1 S] (who pointed out this fact to us). 
The symbol d will be defined by structural induction over the language of WSL. 
This is possible because we will allow (nonlogical) function symbols to range over only 
strict functions. (With a more complicated definition of A, it is possible to let functions 
range over monotonic functions [7].) To achieve this, we have a restrictive definition 
of “standard structures” which results in a limited expressive power compared to 
other logics [4,13,9]. We claim that the expressive power is sufficient in computer 
science applications, where one is interested in limiting the use of nonmonotonic 
functions (since they, in general, are nonexecutable) to a few essential operators, such 
as d, strong equality and the approximation relation, which are useful for reasoning 
about monotonic functions (corresponding to implemented programs). In WSL, these 
nonmonotonic operators can be constructively defined by means of the d-operator. 
The resulting WSL system is simple, and many interesting properties of WSL can be 
established by relatively simple modifications of the proofs for similar properties of 
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classical logic. As such, we find WSL a promising candidate for a three-valued logic, 
since the main achievement of logic must be to define systems that are as simple as 
possible and yet have a sufficient expressive power. 
Relation to other three-valued logics 
The calculus we suggest has been discarded by others without further investigation 
because of the invalidity of the trivial sequent, i.e. A t-A. Against this criticism, we can 
argue that the trivial sequent is not so obvious in a three-valued setting. For instance, 
is it desirable that O/O= 1 + O/O=0 is valid? Since this is equivalent to the trivial 
sequent _L k I (assuming division by zero is undefined and = strict), such sequents 
are valid in ww, ss and SW! 
Furthermore, the “deduction theorem” and “modus ponens”’ are sound in WSL, 
but not in LPF, WL, and PFOL. These rules may be formalized as 
In LPF the rule =-I has the side-condition that A must be defined, and in WL and 
PFOL the rule =+E has the side-condition that A must be defined. A further problem 
with PFOL is that the cut rule does not hold without a similar side-con- 
dition. The presence of such side-conditions violates the symmetry of the calculus.2 
WL and PFOL have basically3 the same expressive power as WSL, but the expressive 
power of LPF covers also nonmonotonic operators (since d is primitive in LPF). 
Nonmonotonicity necessitates a side-condition on the rule: 
(3-I 1 
rl k- r,dwxi 
rI t r2, 3x: T.A 
(where [t/x] denotes substitution of x by t), namely rI k TZ, d,t. It is not sufficient 
that t is a well-formed term of type T. For instance, from k 1 A [I] one may not 
conclude that I- 3x: T.1 A[x]. 
’ Here we mean modus ponens in the form of 3-E and not in the form A, A =+ B t- B considered in [9]. As 
pointed out there, the latter version is not valid in WSL. 
‘To be fair, the problem is not as intricate for the basic calculus of WL as it is for LPF and PFOL. The 
--E rule is not part of the basic calculus needed to establish completeness. A pure calculus for WL would 
be exactly as the one for classical logic, but the problem is that one would (or could after some small 
modifications of the interpretation of the j-quantifier) have no information at all about undefinedness, 
because of the weak interpretation! This problem appears when one wants to use nonlogical axioms, cf. the 
=-E rule. 
-‘In WL and PFOL, function symbols are interpreted as strict functions, but in both logics the 
nonmonotonic definedness operator, represented by .4 in this paper, is considered primitive. 
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By the requirement that free variables range over defined values only, and by the 
inductive definition of definedness, we avoid the introduction of nonmonotonic 
connectives in the base logic. However, essential nonmonotonic connectives may be 
defined constructively by means of the well-definedness operator. Thus, nonmono- 
tonic formulas may be transformed into monotonic ones. One may extend WSL by 
taking the nonmonotonic connectives as logical symbols. The constructive relation- 
ship to the monotonic part of the logic may be exploited to derive sound and complete 
rules for the extended logic. 
A more comprehensive comparison of WSL with other logics may be found 
in [16]. 
3. Classification of terms and formulas 
In this section we first formalize the language of the logic and its interpretation. We 
define the well-definedness operator by structural induction. We end the section by 
some more formal considerations about the expressive power of the logic. 
Syntax 
WSL is many-sorted and the language is defined for a finite number S, T, . . . of 
different sorts. However, the sorts do not play an essential role in this paper. 
Formulas are always taken to be of sort Boo/ (boolean). The language is defined by 
logical and nonlogical symbols. The (minimal set of) logical symbols consists of true 
(true), undefined (I), negation (1) conjunction (A ), and, for each sort T, a universal 
quantifier (VT) and an equality relation (==). The nonlogical symbols consist of 
a countable number of 
l function symbols (f: T--+S), 
o a characteristic predicate Df : T+Bool for eachf; 
l variables (xT) for each sort T. 
(Functions with co-domain Boo/, i.e. predicates, will often be denoted with a 
P instead of an 1: ) The characteristic predicate of f’will be used to express when 
,f is well-defined, such that of(f) is true when f(t) is well-defined for well-defined 
t. The characteristic predicate of a total function is true. All characteristic pre- 
dicates are by definition total. (Therefore, the characteristic predicate of a char- 
acteristic predicate is not needed.) It is also strict and, thus, monotonic - in contrast 
to A. 
The classes of well-formed terms and well-formed formulas are defined as usual. 
Terms and formulas involving typing conflicts are not considered well-formed. A for- 
mula or term is closed if it does not contain any free variables (in the usual sense). 
Substitution is defined as usual: A[ t/x] means that all free occurrences of x are 
replaced by t (renaming bound variables in A in order to avoid name clashes with free 
variables of t). 
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Monotonic extensions of the language 
Other logical symbols may be introduced by the following abbreviations: 
falsesitrue 
3x: T.A=lV_x: T.-IA 
AvB-l(lA~lB) 
(existential quantification) 
(disjunction) 
A-B=(lA)vB (implication) 
AoB=(A-B)A(B-A) (bi-implication). 
It turns out that A o B is equivalent to A = B. 
A nonstrict boolean conditional can be introduced by the following abbreviation: 
(ifAthenBelseC)-(Ar\(A*B))v(iAr\(iA=C)). 
Note that (A A 1 B) v (1 A A B) is total and strict with respect to A and B, and gives 
rise to an exclusive-or operator. 
Standard structures 
A standard structure for the language L with sorts S, T, . . . is defined as follows. 
Each sort S, T, . . . is assigned a nonempty, countable set of objects ST, . . . Further- 
more, S’ (S-lifted) is equal to S u{ Is}, where Is is a distinguished “undefined” object 
for each S. In particular, BooI’= {true, false, lBool}. 
A structure over L is defined as the tuple 
({SL,TL,...},F,h 4)> 
where 
F maps each function symbol ,f to strict function f :T’+S’ and maps each 
characteristic predicate symbol D, to a strict and total function Df : T’-+ Bool’, such 
that Df is true whenever f is defined and false otherwise. 
[ Jc classifies any term of type T (including Bool) into a value of T’ under the 
“assignment” (substitution) (T of the free variables in the term (defined below). 
For each variable x of type T, an assignment CJ assigns a value in T, denoted as XD. The 
classification of closed terms does not depend on 6. 
Classijication of terms and formulas 
The classification of formulas is based on Kleene’s extended interpretations 
[x]b=xa for variable x 
D(t)ll0=(W))(1rID0) f or nonlogical functions (and characteristic 
predicates) f 
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true if [AjO =false, 
[[lA],= false if [A].=true, 
I BOOI otherwise. 
: 
true if [A],=true and [Bjo=true, 
[AA B]~= false if [A],=false or [B],=false, 
1 BOO1 otherwise. 
true if, for all CET, [A].+lci.x,=true, 
[Vx: T. Ajo = false if, for some CET, [AJ.+~c,!~~l=false, 
_L Boo1 otherwise. 
[rtruej, = true, 
ulno = L 
where g1 +a2 denotes overwriting ~r by ~7~. 
Validity of sequents and soundness qf kference rules 
A sequent l-r F r2 is valid iff for all assignments cr, there is some AEON such that 
[A],=false or some Aer2 such that [rAj,=true. A sequent is invalid ifit is not valid. 
An inference rule is sound if validity of all the premises implies validity of the 
conclusion. 
Well-de$nedness 
The A-symbol is a metasymbol that can be eliminated by repeated application of 
the following rewrite rules: 
d[Vx: T.A]=(Vx: T,d[A])v(3x: T.(d[A]/\lA)) 
d,[f(t)]=d.[t] AD,-(~) (where .f: T-S) 
d[D,(t)]rd,[t] (where D,: T-+Bool) 
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dT[cT] = true (for all constants of type T) 
AT [xT] = true (for all variables of type T) 
A[l_] -false 
Any formula involving a A-symbol can always be replaced with a monotonic equiva- 
lent. In this sense there is a part of the logic that is monotonic and any formula in the 
logic can be rewritten to a normal form, inside this monotonic part. 
The simple definition of definedness over the standard structures gives rise to some 
nice closure properties: by structural induction over the language, it can be justified 
that the above definitions are both necessary and sufficient requirements for the 
definedness of a formula or a term, in the sense that for any structure, [Aa0 # lBOOl iff 
[AIA]JO=true. Similarly, it holds for terms, i.e. [Tibet iff [A,[t]j,=true for any 
term of type T. Note that these properties depend on the requirement that each 
function and predicate is associated with a characteristic predicate. 
Furthermore, it follows that [A [A [t]] _Uc = true for any term t. (This can be proved 
by structural induction over the language.) Thus, we can accept the following axiom as 
consistent with the above system: 
t- A CA Ctll. 
Note that a total and strict and-operator may be defined as a nonlogical function 
(predicate) and with the nonlogical axiom I- Vx, y: Bool . and (x, y) =(x A y). 
Other nonmonotonic operators 
Nonmonotonic connectives like strong equality and an approximation relation can 
be defined constructively by means of the well-definedness operator: 
A-B = A[A]=A[B]A(A[A]=P(A=B)) (strongequality), 
A LB = A[A] =>(A[B] r\(A=B)) (approximation). 
Examples of strong equalities are already given above. 
On expressive completeness 
Cheng [4] proves his basic set of connectives expressive complete for all truth- 
valued n-ary functions. However, as already discussed, we are interested only in the 
monotonic truth-valued functions. 
Theorem 3.1 (Expressive completeness). L is expressively complete for any n-ary 
monotone function in Bool;+Booll. 
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Proof (sketch ~4~). Blarney [3, Section 4.11 proves that the set (1, v, A, x , true, 
false) is expressively complete (in the above sense). Interjunction can be defined in 
WSL as 
AwB-((AAB)V(AAI)V(BAI)). 0 
The expressive power of WSL could be increased by taking the d-symbol as 
a primitive, and by skipping the requirements of the basic functions to be strict. This 
modification would leave WSL with an expressive power equal to that of LPF, and 
still its basic system would be simpler than those discussed in Section 2. Apart from 
the problem with the 3-I rule for LPF, none of the asymmetries of the logics [2,9, 131 
discussed in Section 2 have anything to do with their additional expressive power, and 
the description of the d-operator given above could be adopted in those logics as well. 
The asymmetries are due to the choice of consequence relation. 
4. Minimal proof system 
In the minimal system we consider sequents with empty left-hand sides, and we 
omit the sequent symbol in the proof rules. It is understood that a formula of the form 
d [t] has been reduced to its normal form. The rules given below are sufficient to 
establish the completeness of the system with equality: 
Logical axioms 
(Ax) 
lLl[A],A,lA 
The d-symbol is a metasymbol 
Section 3. 
Logical rules 
(11) 
r, A 
I-,11/4 
(CM) 
r,A 1-,B 
l-,Ar\B 
that can be eliminated by applying the definitions of 
(Neg-Conj) 
l-1 A,lB 
r,l(A/\B) 
(All) r’ A 
1-,Vx: T. A 
x (of type T) not free in r (eigenvariable condition) 
(Neg-All) 
r,l A [t/xl 
T,lVx: T.A 
t of type T 
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Those familiar with LPF [4] will remember that usually t in “Neg-All” (also 
known as 3-1, cf. Section 2) is required to be well-defined. This is not necessary here, 
because in the case where t is undefined, it can be replaced with any other term of 
that sort without changing anything. It is exactly at this point that we can see what 
we gain by considering only the monotonic cases. If we increased the expressive 
power as discussed in the end of Section 3, then we would need to add a side- 
condition AT[t] to the “Neg-All” rule, thereby destroying the symmetry of the basic 
calculus. 
Equality 
The basic equality relation is strict and monotonic (which can be seen from the 
definition of standard structures): 
(=I 
lAT[t], t=t 
This axiom has a definedness condition similar to that of the trivial sequent. In WSL 
all axioms must be well-defined, or have conditions ensuring definedness: 
(= -subst) 
r,s=t l-3 ACslxl 
r,AL-tlxl 
Other rules 
r,itrue 
(false) r 
I- 
(Weak) ~ 
r, A 
(Cont) 
r,A,A 
r,. 
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness and completeness). Let r be a sequent over L. r is provable iff 
r is valid. 
The completeness and soundness of the system is proved in the usual way [S], and 
we omit the details. 
When nonlogical axioms are introduced, elimination rules are needed as well as the 
following “well-definedness” rule: 
(Def) z 
r,AA’ 
(As mentioned earlier, the elimination rules are the classical ones, but V-elimination 
must require well-defined substitutions.) 
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5. Some properties of WSL 
In this section we show that WSL without equality has the cut elimination property 
and that WSL supports rewriting in the sense of “folding” and “unfolding” definitions. 
Both these properties are essential, but for different reasons. The cut elimination 
property ensures that the logic is symmetric, and gives rise to simple decision 
procedures. Rewriting is essential for reasoning about nonlogical axioms used for 
defining programs, etc. 
Cut elimination 
The cut rule is not part of the minimal proof system (and if it was, it could always be 
eliminated): 
(Cut) Tl,A r f’,JA 
13 2 
Theorem 5.1 (Cut elimination). Any proof in the basic system without equality using 
cuts can be transformed to a cut-free proof. 
Proof (sketch only). As remarked in [lS], any proof in the basic system without 
equality using cuts can be reduced to a proof with only atomic cuts. This can be proved 
in the usual way by pushing atomic cuts up into the nodes of the proof trees, and 
by eliminating all other cuts in the usual way. This is possible because the basic proof 
rules are equivalent to the similar proof rules in the LK-calculus (refer e.g. [lo]). Thus, 
we will always end up with cuts consisting only of axioms, and they are redundant. 0 
Rewriting 
The =-subst rule can be changed into a more convenient form, which can be used 
for “folding” and “unfolding” definitions (formalizing the use of = in Section 3). 
( = -subst) 
r,s-t r, ACslxl 
r, A [t/xl 
The approximation relation (“less-than-or-equally-defined-as”) is practically useful 
for formulation of nonlogical axioms. For instance, the axiom x/x E 1 is consistent 
with the intented semantics, whereas x/x E 1 (or x/x = 1) is not (it would follow that 
division is total). Since rewrite rules, typically, have right-hand sides better defined 
than the left-hand sides, the approximation relation gives rise to unconditional rewrite 
rules. With such rules, rewriting of monotonic terms may be performed as usual: 
( F -subst) 
r,sct r,ACslxl 
1-,A[t/x] 
Note that = satisfies trt, and c satisfies t L t and I E t. 
A simple sequent calculus for partial functions 329 
6. Final remarks 
WSL offers reasoning close to classical logic in the sense that the classical proof 
rules are preserved. In particular, it is appealing that the symmetry of classical logic is 
not destroyed by adding definedness premises in the rules. 
We believe WSL handles the gap in truth values, resulting from undefined terms, 
where it is most natural to handle it; namely, at the level of the logical axioms. Thus, 
by avoiding nonmonotonicity and accepting that A F A does not hold, we have got 
a calculus which is strong enough to ensure strong validity of consequents and at the 
same time is simple and elegant. The constructive definition of nonmonotonic oper- 
ators enables nonmonotonic formulas to be reduced to monotonic ones. 
As for the restricted interpretation of functions, the full expressive power offered by 
some three-valued logics does not seem to be needed in computer science applications, 
as long as reasoning about strong equality, approximations and well-definedness is 
possible. Although we have required functions to be strict, this requirement can be 
relaxed to just a requirement for monotonicity; cf. [7]. Since executable functions and 
constructs in most programming languages are monotonic, these may be modeled by 
monotonic functions. 
In particular, reasoning about recursively defined functions is described in [16]. 
One may reason about approximations of recursive functions without touching 
well-definedness issues or characteristic predicates. However, the characteristic predi- 
cates simplify reasoning about well-definedness issues. Applications of WSL to other 
areas of computer science, such as abstract data types, term rewriting and Hoare logic, 
are demonstrated in [6]. 
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